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MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
a period of two years from and after the
effective date of this act."
Title of Act.
An act authorizing finance companies to
write motor vehicula r insurance subject to
certain restrictions and limiting to types
of insurance to be sold; authorizing the
commissioner of insurance to make rules
and regulations governing the same; providing exception to the general insurance
code as applied to such companies, and

41-5-4

requiring the approval of rates and policies
by insurance commissioner prior to issuance or sale.

Collateral References.
Insurancee:::>4,
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 62.
What constitutes "upset" or "overturning" within provisions of property damage policy covering losses so caused, 8 A.
L. R. 2d 1433.

41-5-2. Rules and regulations.-The state insurance commissioner is
hereby authorized to make such rules and regulations necessary for the
proper control and management of finance companies writing and issuing
insurance policies or contracts under the provisions of this act respecting
insurance written by such finance companies.
History: L. 1947, ch. 62, § 2; C, 1943,
Supp., 57-6a-16.

41-5-3. Submission of rates and copy of policy to insurance commissioner.-Said companies must submit the rates to be charged for such insurance and a copy of the contract or policy of insurance proposed to be
written by the finance company to the insurance commissioner, and obtain
his approval of such policy and rates prior to the issuance or sale of any
such policy.
Hist ory: L. 1947, ch. 62, § 3; C, 1943,
Supp., 57-6a-17.

41-5-4. Applicability of general insurance code.-The provisions of the
general insurance code relating to eligibility of investments, deposits of
securities and capital and surplus requirements shall not be applicable to
finance companies operating under the provisions of this act; except that
section 31-12-4 and section 31-12-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, shall be
applicable and in compliance with requirements of Title 31, Chapter 13,
Utah Code Annotated 1953.
History: L. 1947, ch. 62, § 4; C. 1943,
Supp., 57-6a-18; L. 1949, ch, 55, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment added "except that
* * * Utah Code Annotated 1953."

CHAPTER 6
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
ARTICLE 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS, 41-6-1 TO 41-6-10.
EFFEC1' m' AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC REGULATIONS, 41-6-11 TO 41-6-19,
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS AND MARKINGS, 41-6-20 TO 41-6 -28,
ACCIDENTS, 41-6-29 TO 41-6-42,
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING, 41-6-43 TO 41-6-45.
SPEED RESTRICTIONS, 41-6-46 1'0 41-6-52.1.
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, OVER·
TAKING, PASSING AND OTHER RULES OF THE ROAD, 41-6-53 TO 41-6-65.
TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING OR TURNING, 41-6-66 TO 41-6-71.
RiGHT OF WAY, 41-6-72 TO 41-6-76,
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10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

PEDESTRIANS' RIGHTS AND DUTIES, 41-6-77 TO 41-6-79, 41-6-80.1 TO 41-6-82 [ 416-80 Repealed].
BICYCLES, REGULATION OF OPERATION, 41-6-83 TO 41-6-90.
RAILROAD TRAINS AND SAFETY ZONES, 41-6-91 TO 41-6-94.
SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED, 41-6-95 TO 41-6-100.10.
STOPPING, STANDING AND PARKING, 41-6-101 TO 41-6-104.
MISCELLANEOUS RULES, 41-6-105 TO 41-6-116.
EQUIPMENT, 41-6-117 TO 41-6-175.

ARTICLE 1
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
Section 41-6-1.
41-6-2.
41-6-3.
41-6-4.
41-6-5.

Definitions.
Various types of vehicles.
Authorized emergency vehicle-School bus-Various types of tractors.
Truck-Bus-Various types of trailers.
Tires-Railroad-Railroad train- Explosives- Liquids - Fissionable
material.
41-6-6.
Gross weight-Department-Various persons-Local authorities.
41-6-7.
Streets, highways and roads and portions thereof.
41-6-8.
Intersection-Crosswalk-Safety zone-Business, residence, and urban
districts.
Official traffic-control device or signal-Railroad sign or signal-Traf41-6-9.
fic-Right of way-Guide dog.
41-6-10. Stop, stopping or standing-Park.

41-6-1. Definitions.-The following words and phrases when used in
this act shall, for the purpose of this act, have the meanings respectively
ascribed to them.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943,
57-7-78; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment deleted "in this article" appearing after "ascribed to them";
deleted the definitions formerly a part of
this section and re-enacted the definitions
into new sections 41-6-2 to 41-6-10.
Former sections 57-7-1 to 57-7-77, R. S.
1933 were repealed by Laws 1941, ch. 52,
§ 158.

Title of Act.
An act regulating traffic on highways
and defining certain crimes in the use and
operation of vehicles; providing for inspection of vehicles and prescribing the
equipment used thereon; requiring the
filing of reports of accidents on highways
by operators or occupants of motor vehicles involved; providing for traffic signs
and signals, and defining the power of local
authorities to enact or enforce ordinances,
rules, or regulations in regard to matters
embraced within the provisions of this act;
prov iding for the enforcement of this act
and prescribing penalties for the violation
thereof, and making uniform the law relating to the subject matter of this act;
and repealing Sections 36-1-23, 36-1-25, and
36-1-35, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933

and repealing Section 36-1-26, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933 as amended by
Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935, and repealing Section 36-1-2lx as enacted by
Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935; and repealing Chapter 7 of Title 57, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, including in such
repeal Sections 57-7-55 as amended by
Chapter 40, Laws of Utah, 1933, as amended by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935,
and Sections 57-7-6, 57-7-10, 57-7-11, 57-712, 57-7-16, 57-7-21, 57-7-23, 57-7-24, 57-7-25,
57-7-29, 57-7-36, 57-7-42, 57-7-44, 57-7-47,
57-7-48, 57-7-56, 57-7-60, 57-7-66, 57-7-74,
57-7-75, and 57-7-76, as amended by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935, and also
repealing Sections 57-7-lOx, 57-7-23x, 57-750x, 57-7-64x, 57-7-64xl, 57-7-64x2, 57-764x3, 57-7-64x4, and 57-7-64x5, as enacted
by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935.
Uniform Laws.
The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on
Highways was declared obsolete by the
National Conference of Commissioners on
U niform State Laws in August 1943. (See
Handbook of the National Conference,
1943, page 69 and the 1959 Handbook,
pages 296, 297.)
In 1949 the Conference endorsed the
Uniform Vehicle Code revised and approved by the National Conference on
Street and Highway Safety. In 1948 the
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National Conference endorsed certain revisions approved by the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety.
The Motor Vehicle Act Regulating Traffic on Highways was adopted in Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Puerto Rico, and
with modifications in Arkansas, Colorado,
Pelaware, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia
and Washington.

Cross-References.
:Municipal regulations, 10-8-30.
Words and phrases defined by statute,
construction of, 68-3-11.
Collateral References.
Automobiles@::::>1-3, 6.

41-6-2

60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1-8, 16.
7 Am. Jnr. 2d 598, 599, 603 et seq., 775,
Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1, 2,
10 et. seq., 225.
Applicability of regulations or rules
governing vehic ular traffic to driveways
or other places not legal highways, 80 A.
L. R. 469.
Applicability of state or municipal traffic or vehicle regulations to those engaged
in handling United States mail, 18 A. L.
R. 1169.
Liability for personal injuries by tractor, 48 A. L. R. 939.
Term "highway" in statutory provision
relative to vehicle traffic as including
street, 54 A. L. R. 1250.
What is street or highway intersection
within traffic rules, 7 A. L. R. 3d 1204.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Construction and application.
This title pertains preponderantly to
motor veh i cles not confined to tracks, viz.:
automobiles and motorcycles and the like.
It is a Uniform Act designed to regulate
nonrail vehicular traffic on streets, and,
therefore, expressly excludes steam trains,
trolley and interurban cars. Thorpe v.
Bamberger R. Co., 107 U. 265, 153 P. 2d
541, discussing r epeal of former laws and
holding that the power to require interurban trains to stop at through streets

was, by the legislature, granted to cities
entirely independent of Title 41, U. C. A.
1953, and referring to Title 10, which contains most of the power granted by the
legislature to cities and towns.
Subsection (a) of this section, prior to
1949 amendment, excluded from the operation of this act "vehicles used exclusively
upon stationary rails and tracks." Thorpe
v. Bamberger R. Co., 107 U. 265, 153 P.
2d 541.

41-6-2. Various types of vehicles.-(a) "Vehicle." Every device in,
upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or
drawn upon a highway, except devices moved by human power or used
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
(b) "Motor Vehicle." Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley
wires, but not operated upon rails.
(c) "Motorcycle." Every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, having
a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not
more than three wheels in contact with the ground and weighing less
than 1250 pounds.
( d) "Motor-Driven Cycle." Every motorcycle, including every motor
scooter, with a motor which produces not to exceed five horsepower, and
every bicycle with motor attached.
(e) "Bicycle." Every device propelled, by human power upon which
any person may ride, having two tandem wheels either of which is over
twenty (20) inches in diameter.
(£) "Special Mobile Equipment." Every vehicle not designed or used
primarily for the transportation of persons or property and only incidentally operated or moved over a highway, including but not limited
to: ditch digging apparatus, well boring apparatus and road construction
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and maintenance machinery such as asphalt spreaders, bituminous mixers,
bucket loaders, tractors other than truck tractors, ditches [ditchers], leveling graders, finishing machines, motor graders, road rollers, scarifiers,
earth moving carry-alls and scrapers, power shovels and drag lines, and selfpropelled cranes and earth moving equipment. The term does not include
house trailers, dump trucks, truck mounted transit mixers, cranes or shovels,
or other vehicles designed for the transportation of persons or property to
which machinery has been attached.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.1, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1961 amendment added subsec. (f).
The bracketed word "ditchers" was inserted by the compiler.

Collateral References.
AutomobilesP6.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.
Airplane as within terms "vehicle,"
"motor vehicle," etc., 165 A. L. R. 916.
Motorcycle as within statute or ordinance in relation to motorcars, motordriven cars, etc., 48 A. L. R. 1090, 70
A. L. R. 1253.

41-6-3. Authorized emergency vehicle-School bus-Various types of
tractors.-(a) "Authorized Emergency Vehicle." Vehicles of the fire department, police vehicles, and such ambulances and emergency vehicles of
municipal departments or public service corporations as are designated or
authorized by the department or local authorities.
(b) "School Bus." Every bus owned by a public or governmental
agency and operated primarily for the transportation of school children
or privately owned and primarily operated for the transportation of school
children, except such vehicles as are chartered or leased by a school district from a certified contract carrier, or common carrier, when such vehicles
are subject to inspection by the public service commission of Utah.
( c) "Truck Tractors." Every motor vehicle designed and used primarily
for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry a load other
than a part of the weight of the vehicle and load so drawn.
( d) "Farm Tractors." Every motor vehicle designed and used primarily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and
other implements of husbandry.
( e) "Road Tractor." Every motor vehicle designed and used for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry any load thereon
either independently or any part of the weight of a vehicle or load so
drawn.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.2, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 1;
1961, ch. 86, § 1.

owned or operated for compensation for
the transportation of children to or from
school."

Compiler's Notes.
The 1957 amendment substituted "department" for "state road commission"
before "or local authorities" in the first
paragraph.
The 1961 amendment rewrote subsec.
(b), which read: "Every motor vehicle
owned by a public or governmental agency
and operated for the transportation of
children to or from school or privately

Ambulance service.
Ambulance operated by service registered with public service commission, and
involved in accident while making emergency run was "authorized emergency vehicle" within meaning of statute and was
in privileged status with respect to speed
limits and traffic signals despite contentions that ambulance driver was negligent
as matter of law for exceeding speed
1.
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and that ambulance service was not authorized by "local authority." Howe v.
Jackson, 18 U. (2d) 269, 421 P . 2d 159.

limit and ignoring traffic signals,, that ambulance service was not "public service
corporation" within the meaning of law,

41-6-4. Truck-Bus-Various types of trailers.-(a) "Truck." Every
motor vehicle designed, used or maintained primarily for the transportation of property.
(b) "Bus." Every motor vehicle equipped for carrying more than 10
passengers and used for the transportation of persons other than a taxicab.
(c) "Trailer." Every vehicle with or without motive power, other
than a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for
being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that no part of its
weight rests upon the towing vehicle.
(d) "Semitrailer." Every vehicle with or without motive power, other
than a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for
being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that some part of its
weight and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle.
( e) "Pole Trailer." Every vehicle without motive power designed to
be drawn by another vehicle and attached to the towing vehicle by means
of a reach, or pole, or by being boomed or otherwise secured to the towing vehicle and ordinarily used for transporting long or irregular shaped
loads such as poles, pipes or structural members capable, generally, of
sustaining themselves as beams between the supporting connections.
(f) "House Trailer." A trailer or semitrailer in excess of 1,500 pounds
gross weight which is designed, constructed and equipped as a dwelling
place, living abode or sleeping place either permanently or temporarily
and is equipped for use as a conveyance on streets and highways, or
(g) A trailer or a semitrailer whose chassis and exterior shell is
designed and constructed for use as a house trailer, as defined in paragraph
(f), but which is used instead permanently or temporarily for the advertising, sales, display or promotion of merchandise or services, or for any
other commercial purpose except the transportation of property for hire
or the transportation of property for distribution by a private carrier.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.3, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1961 amendment substituted "other

than a taxicab" for "; and every motor
vehicle, other than a taxicab, equipped
and used for th e transportation of persons
for compensation" in subsec. (b) and
added subsecs. (f) and (g).

41-6-5. Tires-Railroad-Railroad train-Explosives-Liquids-Fissionable material.-(a) "Pneumatic Tire." Every tire in which compressed
air is designed to support the load.
(b) "Solid Tire." Every tire of rubber or other resilient material
which does not depend upon compressed air for the support of the load.
( c) "Metal Tire." Every tire the surface of which in contact with
the highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard nonresilient material.
(d) "Railroad." A carrier of persons or property upon cars, operated
upon stationary rails.
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( e) "Railroad Train." A steam engine, electric or other motor, with
or without cars coupled thereto, operated upon rails.
(f) "Explosives." Any chemical compound or mechanical mixture
that is commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion and which contains any oxidizing and combustive units or other
ingredients in such proportions, quantities or packing that an ignition
by fire , by friction, by concussion, by percussion or by detonator of any
part of the compound or mixture may cause su ch a sudden generation
of highly h eated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable
of producing destructible effects on contiguous objects or of destroying
life or limb.
(g) "Flammable Liquid." Any liquid which has a flash point of 70
degrees F. or less, as determined by a tabliabue or equivalent closed-cup
test device.
(h) "Corrosive Liquid." A strong mineral acid or other corrosive
fluid which is liable to cause fire when mixed with chemicals or with
organic matter.
(i) "Fissionable Material." Any material whose nucleus will split into
one or more approximate equal parts, when receiving energy from any
external source.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.4, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.

Collateral References.
Automobiles<g:;:,6.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.

The 1961 amendment a dded subsec. (i).
Liability of motor vehicle owner or
operator for accident occasioned by blowout or other failure of tire, 24 A. L. R.
2d 161.

41-6-6. Gross weight--Department-Various persons-Local authorities.- (a) "Gross Weight." The weight of a vehicle without load plus the
weight of any load thereon.
(b) "Department." The department of public safety of this state.
(c) "Persons." Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association
or corporation.
( d) "Pedestrian." Any person afoot.
(e)
"Driver." Every person who drives or is in actual physical control
of a vehicle.

(f) "Owner." A person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or in the
event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or
lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions
stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested
in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle
is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this act.
(g) "Police Officer." Every officer authorized to direct or regulate
traffic or to make arrests for violations of traffic regulations.
(h) "Local Authorities." Every county, municipal, and other local
board or body having authority to adopt local police regulations under the
constitution and laws of the state.
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History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.5, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1955 amendment substituted "department of public safety" for "state tax
commission" in subsec. (b).
1.

Ambulance service.

Ambulance operated by service registered with public service commission, and

41-6-7

involved in accident while making emergency run was " a uthorized emergency vehicle" within the meaning of statute and
was in privileged status with respect to
speed limits and traffic signals notwithstanding contention that ambulance service was not a uthorized by particular "local
authority" to serve as emergency vehicle
where collision occurred. Howe v. Jackson, 18 U. (2d) 269, 421 P. 2d 159.

41-6-7. Streets, highways and roads and portions thereof.- (a) "Street
or Highway." The entire width between the boundary lines of every way
publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public
for purposes of vehicular travel.
(b) "Private Road or Driveway." Every way or place in private ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express
or implied permission from the owner, but not by other persons.
(c) "Roadway." That portion of highway improved, designed or
ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder.
In the event a highway includes two or more separate roadways the term
"roadway" as used herein shall refer to any such roadway separately but
not to all such roadways collectively.
( d) "Sidewalk." That portion of a street between the curb lines, or
the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for
the use of pedestrians.
(e) "Laned Highway." A highway the roadway of which is divided
into three or more clearly marked lanes for vehicular traffic.
(f) "Through Highway." Every highway or portion thereof at the
entrances to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required
by law to stop before entering or crossing the same and when stop signs
are erected as provided in this act.
(g) "Limited-access Highway." Every highway, street, or roadway
in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other persons
have no legal right of access to or from the same except at such points only
and in such manner as may be determined by the public authority having
jurisdiction over such highway, street, or roadway.
(h) "Arterial Street." Any United States or state numbered route,
controlled access highway, or other major radial or circumferential street
or highway designated by local authorities within their respective jurisdictions as part of a major arterial system of streets or highways.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.6, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1955 amendment added sub sec. (h).
Cross-Reference.
Limited-access facilities, 27-12-111 et seq.
1, Roadways.
Not every driveway between a sidewalk
and a street falls within definition of road-

w ay; pedestrian who was walking along
edge of driveway ancl was out of regular
course of travel was not contributorily
negligent as a matter of law as to motorist
who backed from garage and strnck h er.
Ivie v. Richardson, 9 U. (2d) 5, 336 P. 2d
781.

Collateral References.
A utomo bilese=:>6.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.
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Liability of t enant occupying abutting
premises for injury from ice formed on
sidewalk by discharge of rain or melted

snow thereon because of condition existing on premises, 22 A. L. R. 2d 738.

41-6-8. Intersection-Crosswalk-Safety zone-Business, residence, and
urban districts.- (a) "Intersection." (1) The area embraced within the
prolongation or connection of the lateral curblines, or, if none, then the
lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one
another at, or approximately at, right angles, or the area within which
vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle come
in conflict.
(2) Where a highway includes two roadways (30) feet or more apart,
then every crossing of each roadway of such divided highway by an intersecting highway shall be regarded as a separate intersection. In the event
such intersecting highway also includes two roadways (30) feet or more
apart, then every crossing of two roadways of such highways shall be regarded as a separate intersection.
(b) "Crosswalk." That part of a roadway at an intersection included
within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides
of the highway measured from the curbs, or in the absence of curbs, from
the edges of the traversable roadway; any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or
other markings on the surface.
( c) "Safety Zone." The area or space officially set apart within a
roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected or is
so marked or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all
times while set apart as a safety zone.
( d) "Business District." The territory contiguous to and including a
highway when within any 600 feet along such highway there are buildings
in use for business or industrial purposes, including but not limited to
hotels, banks or office buildings, railroad stations, and public buildings
which occupy at least 300 feet of frontage on one side or 300 feet collectively on both sides of the highway.
( e) "Residence District." The territory contiguous to and including a
highway not comprising a business district when the property on such
highway for a distance of 300 feet or more is in the main improved with
residences or residences and building in use for business.
(f) "Urban Districts." The territory contiguous to and including any
street which is built up with structures devoted to business or industry,
or where dwelling houses are situated at intervals of less than 100 feet for
a distance of a quarter of a mile or more.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.7, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1955 amendment added subsec. (f).
Crosswalks.
Even though many people may cross a
street at a certain place, a crosswalk is
not created since use, by itself, does not
1.

establish a right of way for pedestrians.
Langlois v. Rees, 10 U. (2d) 272, 351 P.
2d 638.
The statutory definition implies that
there is an unmarked crosswalk only if
a street's sidewalk ( or the edge of the
traversable roadway) is intersected and
continues on and if a pedestrian way terminates at an intersection, it terminates
without crossing the street unless it con-
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tinues as a marked crosswalk. Langlois v.
Rees, 10 U. (2d) 272, 351 P. 2d 638.
2. "Intersection."
Jury was properly instructed that site
of collision was "intersection" under statute prohibiting passing another vehicle
within 100 feet of intersection in light of
evidence that crossing road intersected
main highway from both east and west
and crossed it at right angles, that main
highway was widened for about 1/10 of
a mile in both directions to provide extra
lane for acceleration and deceleration in
entering or leaving highway and that there
were stop signs at both east and west

41-6-10

side to warn oncoming traffic; result was
not changed by fact that the crossing road
was only infrequently traveled dirt road
and not readily observable to main highway traveler. Hathaway v. Marx, 21 U.
(2d) 33, 439 P. 2d 850.

Collateral References.
Intersection: What is a street or highway intersection within traffic rules, 7 A.
L . R. 3d 1204.
Street corner or intersection, parking
illegally at or near, as affecting liability
for motor vehicle accident, 4 A. L. R. 3d
324.

41-6-9. Official traffic-control device or signal-Railroad sign or signal
-Traffic-Right of way-Guide dog.-(a) "Official Traffic-Control Devices." All signs, signals, markings and devices not inconsistent with
this act placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having
jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic.
(b) "Official Traffic-Control Signals." Any device, whether manually,
electrically or mechanically operated, by which traffic is alternately directed
to stop and to proceed.
(c) "Railroad Sign or Signal." Any sign, signal or device erected by
authority of a public body or official or by a railroad and intended to give
notice of the presence of railroad tracks or the approach of a railroad train.
(d) "Traffic." Pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, and
other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway for
purposes of travel.
(e) "Right of Way." The right of one vehicle or pedestrian to proceed
in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian approaching under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to
give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other.
(f) "Guide Dog." Every dog, which has been specially trained and
is being used for guiding a person wholly or partially blind, while such
dog is equipped with a harness designed for the purpose of such guiding.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.8, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1;
1961, ch. 86, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1955 amendment substituted "roadway" for "highway" in subsec. (e).
The 1961 amendment rewrote subsec. (e)
which formerly read "The privilege of
the immediate use of the roadway," and
added subsec. (f),

1.

Right of way statutes.

The right of way statutes are designed
to prevent an accident by two persons
both otherwise lawfully on the roadway
reaching the same place at the same time.
The right of way is not absolute for either
pedestrian or motorist, but both have a
continuing duty at all times to use reasonable care for the safety of others, even
when one has the right of way over the
other. Langlois v. Rees, 10 U. (2d) 272,
351 P. 2d 638.

41-6-10. Stop, stopping or standing-Park.-(a) "Stop." When required means complete cessation from movement.
(b) "Stop, Stopping, or Standing." When prohibited means any stopping or standing of a vehicle whether occupied or not, except when
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necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the
directions of a police officer or traffic-control sign or signal.
( c) "Park." When prohibited means the standing of a vehicle,
whether occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of
and while actually engaged in loading or unloading.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.9, enacted by
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1.
Cross-Reference.
Disabled persons, parking privileges, 411-49.9.

Collateral References.
Autornobiles.g:;;,6.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.

Duties a nd liabilities between owners or
drivers of parked or parking vehicles, 25
A. L. R. 2d 1224.
Liability for injury to pedestrian growing out of pulling out of parked motor
vehicle, 29 A. L. R. 2d 136.
Parking illegally at or near street corner
or intersection as affecting liability for
motor vehicle accident, 4 A. L. R. 3d 324.

ARTICLE 2
EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC REGULATIONS
Section 41-6-11.
41-6-12.
41-6-13.
41-6-14.
41-6-15.
41-6-16.
41-6-17.
41-6-18.
41-6-19.

Act relates to vehicles on highways-Exceptio ns.
Violation of act-Misdemeanor.
Obedience to police officer.
Applicability and exemptions.
Persons riding or driving animals to obey r egulations.
Provisions of act uniform throughout state-Local regulations.
Regulatory powers of local authorities-Stop sign or traffic-control
signal on or affecting state highway-Necessity of posting of signs.
Right of real property owner to r egulate traffic.
Removal of brush, foliage or other obstruction impairing view.

41-6-11, Act relates to vehic'1es on highways-Exceptions,-The provisions of this act relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to
the operation of vehicles upon highways except:
(1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section.
(2) The provisions of sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45, inclusive shall apply
upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 2; C. 1943,
57-7-79.
Collateral References.
AutornobilesPl-3, 6.

60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1-8, 16.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 598, 599, 603 et seq., 775,
Automobiles
and Highway Traffic §§ 1, 2,
10
et seq., 225.

41-6-12. Violation of act-Misdemeanor.-It is unlawful, and, unless
otherwise declared in this act with resp ect to particular offenses, it is a
misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidd en or fail to perform
any act required in this act.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 3; C. 1943,
57-7-80.
Collateral References.
Automobiles.g:;;,6. ·
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.
7 Arn. Jur. 2d 723, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic § 168.

Validity and construction of statutes
or ordinances which make noncompliance
wHh motor vehicle r egul ations a p enal
offense without r eference to intent, fault,
or knowl edge, 11 A. L. R. 1434.
Violation of statute or ordinance regulating movem ent of vehicles as affecting
violator's right to recover for n egligence,
12 A. L. R. 458.
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41-6-13. Obedience to police officer.-N o person shall willfully fail or
refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer
invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.
press direction. Miller v. Utah Light &
Traction Co., 96 U. 369, 86 P . 2d 37,
applying R. S. 1933, 57-7-2.

History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 4; C. 1943,
57-7-81.
1. Obedience to traffic officer,

Pedestrian denied recovery - for injuries
sustained when she was struck by overhang of motorbus where from the evidence it appeared that when she was
half-way across the street the traffic light
changed against her and she stopped in
the safety zone, giving the other traffic
the right of way, and that the overhang
of the bus struck her as it rounded the
comer in response to traffic officer's ex-

Collateral References,
Automobiles@:;;> 10.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 609, Automobiles and
Highway 'rraffic § 17.
Motorists' liability for injury to one in
or about a street or highway for the
purpose of directing or warning traffic, 98
A. L. R. 2d 1169.

41-6-14. Applicability and exemptions.-(a) The prov1s10ns of this
act applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to
the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this
state or any county, city, town, district, of [or] any other political subdivision of the state, including authorized emergency vehicles; provided, however, that such authorized emergency vehicles shall be exempt from the
driving restrictions imposed under sections 41-6-20 to and including 41-6-28,
41-6-46 to and including 41-6-82 and 41-6-91 to and including 41-6-106 of this
act when driven under the following conditions:
(1) Said exemption shall apply whenever any said vehicle is being
driven in response to an emergency call or when used in the pursuit of
an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not
returning from a fire alarm.
(2) Said exemption herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle
shall apply only when the driver of any said vehicle while in motion
sotmds audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust whistle as may be reasonably
necessary, and when the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted lamp
displaying a red light visible under normal atmospheric conditions from
a distance of 500 feet to the front of such vehicle, except that an authorized
emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle need not be equipped with
or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle.
(b) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the
consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared in this section.
(c) The provisions of this act shall not apply to persons, teams, motor
vehicles and other equipment while actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway, but shall apply to such persons and vehicles when traveling to or from such work.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-14, re-enacted by
L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1;
1965, ch. 83, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
Section 41-6-14 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 5; C.
1943, 57-7-82; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1), relating
to applicability and exemptions from act
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of certain driv ers, was repealed by Laws
1955, ch. 71, § 1. New section 41-6-14 was
re-enacted by § 1 of the act. The preliminary clause of section 1 read as follows: "Section 1. Secs. 41-6-6, 41-6-7, 41-6-8,
41-6-9, 41-6-34, 41-6-36, 41-6-47, 41-6-49,
41-6-70, 41-6-76, 41-6-77, 41-6-82, 41-6-90,
41-6-114, 41-6-117, 41-6-120, 41-6-121, 41-6123, 41-6-124, 41-6-129, 41-6-131, 41-6-133,
41-6-141, 41-6-142, 41-6-149, 41-6-159, and
27- 1-28, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are
amended; secs. 41-6-14, 41-6-64, 41-6-130,
41-6-132, 41-6-134, 41-6-135, 41-6-140, and
41-6-144, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are
repealed and re-enacted; and new sections
41- 6- 43.10, 41- 6- 72.10, 41- 6 - 121.10, 41 - 6140.10, 41-6-140.20, 41-6-154.10, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, a r e enacted to
read: * * * ."
The 1961 amendment added "except that
* * * front of the vehicle" to subd. (2) of
sub sec. (a) and deleted sub secs. (b) and
( c) which were restored by the 1965
amendment.
The 1965 amendment added subsecs. (b)
and ( c) relating to the duty of care of the
driver of a n emergency vehicle and the
exemption of persons working on the highways.
1.

Ambulance service.

Ambulance operated by service registered with public service commission, and
involved in accident while making emergency run was "authorized emergency vehicle" within the meaning of statute and
was in privileged status with respect to
speed limits and traffic signals despite contentions that ambulance driver was negli-

gent as matter of law for exceeding speed
limit and ignoring traffic signals and that
ambulance service was not "public service
corporation" within the meaning of law.
Howe v. Jackson, 18 U. (2d) 269, 421 P. 2d
159.

Collateral References.
AutomobilesPll.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 726, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic § 172.
Applicability of motor vehicle regulations to public officials or employees, 19
A. L . R. 459, 23 A. L. R. 418 .
Constmction and application of statute
making municipal corporation liable for
damages due to negligence of official or
employee while operating vehicle, 136 A.
L. R. 582.
Criminal or penal responsibility of public officer or employee for violating speed
regulation, 9 A. L. R. 367.
Inspection of motor vehicles by municipal authorities as pertaining to the governmental or to the proprietary functions
of the municipality as regards liability
for damage or injury, 133 A. L. R. 1216.
Personal liability of public official for
injury on highway, 40 A. L. R. 39, 57 A.
L. R. 1037.
Responsibility of public officer for negligence of subordinate in operation of
vehicle, 3 A. L. R. 149.
Use of municipal automobile as a corporate or as a governmental function, llO
A. L. R. 1117, 156 A. L. R. 714.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW

Accident involving emergency vehlcle.
In au action for injuries suffered by
plaintiff in an accident with a police
vehicle which occurred at an intersection,
the question as to whether plaintiff had
been contributorily negligent was one of
fact for the jury and an instruction on the
issue of assumption of risk from which
jury could have believed that the plaintiff
would be barred from recovery by assumption of risk even if she had exercised due
care under the circumstances, was error.
Johnson v. Maynard, 9 U. (2d) 268, 342
P. 2d 884.
Plaintiff was not entitled to recover
damages incident to an intersection collision between his car and car of defendant,
a p eace officer, responding to an emergency call, where plaintiff was negligent
in not hearing siren on defendant's car

and defendant was driving at a reasonable
speed of forty miles per hour while sounding siren and displaying a red light.
Martin v. Ehlers, 13 U. (2d) 236, 371 P.
2d 851.

Construction.
The 1949 amendment placed limitations
on the right of emergency vehicles to proceed past a red stop light. The red light
must be burning on the vehicle and the
siren sounding and the vehicle could proceed past the red stop light only after
slowing down as may be necessary for
safe operation. Thus the driver of a fire
engine was negligent in passing through
a red light with his siren and red light
on but failing to slow down at the intersection for safe operation. Jensen v.
Taylor, 2 U. (2d) 196, 217 P. 2d 838.

41-6-15. Persons riding or driving animals to obey regulations.-Every
person riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a
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roadway shall be subject to the provisions of this act applicable to the
driver of a vehicle, except those provisions of this act which by their
nature can have no application.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 6; C. 1943,
57-7-83.

41-6-16.

Collateral References,
Automobiles<Pl0.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.

Provisions of act uniform throughout state-Local regulations.

-The provisions of this act shall be applicable and uniform throughout
this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and
no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this act unless expressly authorized herein.
Local authorities may, however, adopt regulations consistent with this act,
and additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict therewith.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 7; C. 1943,
57-7-84.

Cross-Reference.
Powers and duties of all cities, traffic
regulations, 10-8-30.

Collateral References.
Automobilese=o7.
60 C.J.S. Motor V ehicl es § 43.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 607, 725, Automobiles
and Highway Traffic § 15, 170.

41-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authorities-Stop sign or trafficcontrol signal on or affecting state highway-Necessity of posting of signs.
- (a) The provisions of this act are intended to confer upon local
authorities the right of, and shall not be deemed to d eprive said authorities
of existing powers with respect to highways under their jurisdiction and
within the reasonable exercise of the police power in:
(1) Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles, including the
requirement for payment of a parking fee, which fee may vary, in order to
relieve traffic congestion in designated areas.
(2) Regulating traffic by means of police officers or traffic-control
signals.
(3) Regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways.
(4) Designating. particular highways as one-way highways and requiring that all vehicles thereon be moved in one specific direction.
(5) Regulating the speed of vehicles in public parks.
(6) Designating any highway as a through highway and reqmrmg
that all vehicles stop before entering or crossing the same or designating
any intersection as a stop intersection and requiring all vehicles to stop
at one or more entrances to such intersections.
(7) Restricting the use of highways as authorized in section 27-1-34
[27-12-145].
(8) Regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration
and licensing of same, including the requirement of a registration fee.
(9) Regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles at intersections.
(10) Altering the maximum speed limits as authorized herein.
(11) Adopting such other traffic regulations as are specifically authorized by this act.
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(b) No local authority shall erect or maintain any stop sign or trafficcontrol signal at any location so as to require the traffic on any state
highway to stop before entering or crossing any intersecting highway
unless approval in writing has first been obtained from the state road
commission.
( c) No ordinance or regulation enacted under subdivisions 4, 5, 6, 7
or 10 of this section shall be effective until signs approved by the state
road commission giving notice of such local traffic regulations are posted
upon or at the entrances to the highway or part thereof affected as may
be most appropriate.
History: L. 1941, ch, 52, § 8; C, 1943,
57-7-85; L. 1949, ch, 65, § 1; 1961, ch.
86, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment r ewrote subd. (7)
and a dded subds. (8), (9), (10) and (11)
of subsec. (a) ,
The 1961 amendment substituted "maximum" for "prima facie" in subd. (10) of
subsec. (a) .
The bracketed reference to section "2712-145" was inserted by the compiler. By
error, the reference in the 1961 amendment
wa s to "27-1-34" instead of "27-1-32." Laws
1963, ch. 39, § 160 repealed 27-1-32, and
the present provision covering the same
subject is compiled as 27-12-145.
Parking of vehicles.
A city has no power to pass an ordin ance declaring owners of vehicles prima
facie responsible for illegal parking of
such vehicles. Nasfell v, Ogden City,
122 U. 344, 249 P. 2d 507,

1.
1 I

'

2.

Evidentiary Rules.
City had no express or implied power,
under subd. (a) (1) , to make presence of
illegally parked vehicle prima facie evidence that owner committed or authorized
the violation. Nasfell v , Ogden City, 122
U. 344, 249 P . 2d 507,
Collateral References.
Automobilese:::>7.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
7 Am. Jur, 2d 606-607, 735, 736, Auto•
mobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 13-15, 181,
183.
Conflict between statutes and local reg•
ulations as to automobiles, 21 A. L. R.
1186, 64 A. L . R. 993, 147 A. L. R. 522.
Constitutionality of legislative delega•
tion of powers to prescribe or vary regulations concerning motor vehicles used on
highways, 87 A. L. R. 546.
Construction and operation of regulations as to sudden stop or slowing of motor
vehicle, 29 A. L. R. 2d 5.
Traffic regulations, failure of municipality to adopt or enforce as ground of
its liability for damage to property or
person, 92 A. L. R . 1495, 161 A. L . R. 1404.

41-6-18. Right of real property owner to regulate trafflc.-Nothing in
this act shall be construed to prevent the owner of real property used by
the public for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner
and not as matter of right from prohibiting such use, or from requiring
other or different or additional conditions than those specified in this
act, or otherwise regulating such use as may seem best to such owner.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 9; C. 1943,
57-7-86,

Collateral References,
Automobilese:::,10,
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 723, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic § 169.

41-6-19. Removal of brush, foliage or other obstruction impairing
view.-The state road commission, with reference to the state highways,
and local authorities, with reference to highways under their jurisdiction,
shall remove from said highways all brush, foliage, or other obstruction
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which interferes with or impairs the view of an intersection or of a railroad grade crossing.
History: C. 1943, 57-7-86.10, enacted by

Collateral References.
Automobilese::>6.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16.

L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1.

ARTICLE 3
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS AND MARKINGS
8ection 41-6-2,0.
41-6-21.
41-6-22.
41-6-23.

Traffic-control devices-U niform state road commission manual.
Placing and maintenance upon state highways.
Placing and maintenance upon local highways by local authorities.
Obeying devices- Effect of improper position, illegibility or absence
-Presumption of lawful placement and compliance with act.
41-6-24. Traffic-control signal-At intersections-At place other than intersection.
41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals-Meaning of signals-Rights and
duties.
41-6-26. Flashing red or yellow signals-Rights and duties of drivers.
41-6-26.5. Lane-direction-control signals.
41-6-27. Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals, lights or markings-C ommercial advertising-Public nuisance-Removal.
41-6-28. Interference with signs and signals prohibited.

41-6-20.

Traffic-control devices-Uniform state road commission man-

ual.-The state road commission shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the
provisions of this act for use upon highways within this state. Such
uniform system shall correlate with and so. far as possible conform to the
system then current as approved by the American association of state
highway officials.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 10; C. 1943,
57-7-87.

Collateral References.
Automobilese:,,10.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §43.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 745-747, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic §§ 194-196.

41-6-21. Placing and maintenance upon state highways.-(a) The state
road commission shall place and maintain such traffic-control devices in
conformance with its manual and specifications upon all state highways
as it shall d eem necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of
this act or to regulate, warn or guide traffic.
(b) No local authority shall place or maintain any traffic-control device upon any highway under the jurisdiction of the state road commission except by the latter's permission.
History: L. 1941, ch, 52, § 11; C. 1943,
57-7·88; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1.

41-6-22.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment substituted "conformance with its manual" for "conforming to its manual" in subsec. (a).

Placing and maintenance upon local highways by local authori-

ties.-Local authorities, in their respective jurisdictions, shall place and
maintain such traffic-control devices upon highways under their juris-
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diction as they may deem necessary to indicate and
provisions of this act or local traffic ordinances or to
guide traffic. All such traffic-control devices hereafter
form to and be maintained in conformance with the
specifications.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 12; C. 1943,
57-7-89; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
Th e 1949 amendment inserted the commas in the first sentence and inserted
" and be maintained in conformanc e with"
in the second sentence.

to carry out
regulate, warn
erected shall c1
state manual a.

Conflict between statutes and local rei
lations as to a utomobiles, 147 A. L.
522.
Constitutionality of legislative deleg
tion of powers to prescribe or vary reg
la tions concerning motor vehicles used o
highways, 87 A. L. R . 546.

Collateral References.
Automobiles~IO.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.

41-6-23. Obeying devices-Effect of improper position, illegibility or
absence-Presumption of lawful placement and compliance with act.( a) No driver of a vehicle shall disobey the instructions of any official
traffic-control device applicable thereto placed in accordance with the
provisions of this act, unless at the time otherwise directed by a police
officer, subject to the exceptions granted the driver of an authorized
emergency vehicle in this act.
(b) No provision of this act, £or which official traffic-control devices
are required, shall be enforced against an alleged violator if at the time
and place of the alleged violation an official device is not in proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant person.
·whenever a particular section does not state that official traffic-control
devic es are required, such section shall be effective even though· no devices
are erected or in place.
( c) Whenever official traffic-control devices are placed in position
approximately conforming to the requirements of this act, such devices
shall be presumed to have been so placed by the official act or direction of
lawful authority, unless the contrary shall be established by competent
evidence.
( d) Any official traffic-control device placed pursuant to the provisions of this act and purporting to conform to the lawful requirements
pertaining to such devices shall be presumed to comply with the requirements of this act, unless the contrary shall be established by competent
evidence.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 13; C. 1943,
57-7-90; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 104,
§ 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 a mendment added "unless at
* * * in this act" to subsec. (a) and
added sub sec. (b).
The 1969 amendment substituted "official traffic-control devices," "device," and
"devices" for "sign" and "signs" in subsec.
(b), and added subs ecs. (c) and (d).

Cross-Reference.
Duty to obey police officers, 41-6-13.
Collateral References.
Liability for automobile accident other
than direct collision with pedestrian as
affected by r eliance upon or disregard of
stop-and-go signal, 2 A. L. R. 3d 12.
Liability for collision of a utomobile with
pedestrian as affected by reliance upon or
disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A. L. R.
3d 155.
.
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Liability for collision of automobile with
ueclestrian at intersection as affected by
;.elian ce upon or disregard of traffic sign
o:· signal other than stop-ancl-go signal, 3
A. L. R. 3d 557.
Liability where automobile accident at
intersection as affected by reliance upon
or disregard of unchanging caution, slow,
danger or like sign or signal, 3 A. L. R.
3cl 507.

41-6-24

Liability where automobile accident at
intersection as affected by reliance upon
or disregard of unchanging stop signal or
sign, 3 A. L. R. 3d 180.
Liability where automobile accident at
inters ection as affected by reliance upon
or clisregard of "yield" sign or signal, 2
A. L. R. 3d 275.
Reckless driving as affected by traffic
signs or signals, 52 A. L. R. 2d 1352.

41-6-24. Traffic-control signal-At intersections-At place other than
intersection.-Whenever traffic is controlled by a traffic-control signal
exhibiting the words "Go," "Caution," or "Stop," or exhibiting different
colored lights successively one at a time, or with arrows, the following
colors only shall be used and said terms and lights shall indicate and apply
to drivers of vehicles and pedestrians as follows:
(a) "Green" alone.
(1) Vehicular traffic facing the signal, except when prohibited under
section 41-6-92, may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a
sign at such place prohibits either such turn. But vehicular traffic shall yield
the right of way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the
intersection at the time such signal is exhibited.
(2) Pedestrians facing the signal may proceed across the roadway
within any marked or unmarked crosswalk.
(b) Steady "Yellow" alone when showing following the "Green"
signal.
(1) Vehicular traffic facing the signal is thereby warned that the
"Red" signal will be exhibited immediately thereafter and such vehicular
traffic shall not enter or be crossing the intersection when the "Red"
signal is exhibited.
(2) Pedestrians facing such signal are thereby advised that there is
insufficient time to cross the roadway, and any pedestrians then starting
to cross shall yield the right of way to all vehicles.
( c) Steady "Red" alone.
(1) Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering the
nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at such other point as may be
indicated by a clearly visible line and shall remain standing until "Green"
is shown alone; provided that vehicular traffic stopped in the lane nearest
the right-hand side of the highway, unless prohibited by a sign, may
cautiously enter the intersection for the purpose of making a turn to the
right but shall not interfere with other traffic nor endanger pedestrians
lawfully within a crosswalk.
(2) No pedestrian facing such signal shall enter the roadway unless
he can do so safely and without interfering with vehicular traffic.
(d) Steady "Red" with "green arrow."
(1) Vehicular traffic facing such signal may cautiously enter the intersection only to make the movement indicated by such arrow, but shall
yield the right of way to pedestrians lawfully within a crosswalk and to
other traffic lawfully using the intersection.
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(2) No pedestrian facing such signal shall enter the roadway un.
he can do so safely and without interfering with vehicular traffic.
( e) In the event an official traffic-control signal is erected and ma
tained at a place other than an intersection, the provisions of this secti
shall be applicable except as to those provisions which by their natl
can have no application. Any stop required shall be made at a sign
marking on the highway pavement indicating where the stop shall
made, but in the absence of any such sign or marking the stop shall 1
made at the signal.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 14; C. 1943,
57-7-91; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1951, ch. 73,
§ 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment added subsec. (e).
Prior to the 1951 amendment the proviso
in subd. (c)(l) read: "provided, that at
intersections where signs or signals so
indicate, vehicular traffic stopped in the
lane nearest the right hand side of the
highway may cautiously enter the intersection for the purpose of making a turn
to the right but shall not interfere with
other traffic nor endanger pedestrians lawfully within a crosswalk."
The 1961 amendment deleted "or 'go' "
after "green" and "'green' alone" in
subds. (a), (b) and (c) (1); deleted "or
'stop' " after "Red" and " 'Red' alone" in
subds. (b) (1) and (c); substituted "steady

'yellow' alone" for " 'yellow' alone or 'Ca,
tion'" in subd. (b); substituted "pede,
trians" for "pedestrian" in subd. (b) (2)
inserted "Steady" before "Red" in subdi
( c) and ( d), and deleted "any" befor,
"vehicular" in subd. (c)(2).

Collateral References.
Liability where automobile accident at
intersection as affected by reliance upon
or disregard of unchanging caution, slow,
danger or like sign or signal, 3 A. L. R.
3d 507.
Liability where automobile accident at
intersection as affected by reliance upon
or disregard of unchanging stop signal or
sign, 3 A. L. R. 3d 180.
Liability for automobile accident other
than direct collision with pedestrian as
affected by reliance upon or disregard of
stop-and-go signal, 2 A. L. R. 3d 12.

41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals-Meaning of signals-Rights
and duties.-Whenever special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting the
words "Walk" or "Wait" or "Don't Walk" are in place, such signals shall
indicate as follows:
(a) "Walk"-Pedestrians facing such signal may proceed across the
roadway in the direction of the signal and shall be given right of way by
the drivers of all vehicles.
(b) "Wait" or "Don't vValk"-No pedestrian shall start to cross the
roadway in the direction of such signal, but any pedestrian who has
partially completed his crossing on the walk signal shall proceed to a
sidewalk or safety island while the wait or don't walk signal is showing.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 15; C. 1943,
57-7-92; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment inserted "or 'Don't
,valk'" in the first sentence and in subsec.
(b) wherever it appears.

Collateral References.
Liability for collision of automobile with
pedestrian as affected by reliance upon or
disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A. L. R.
3d 155.
Liability for collision of automobile with
pedestrian at intersection as affected by
reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign
or signal other than stop-and-go signal,
3 A. L. R. 3d 557.

41-6-26. Flashing red or yellow signals-Rights and duties of drivers.
-Whenever an illuminated flashing red or yellow signal is used in an
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official traffic-control device it shall require obedience by vehicular traffic
as follows:
(1) Flashing red (stop signal). When a red lens is illuminated by
rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles shall stop before entering
the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at a limit line when marked,
or, if none, then before entering the intersection, and the right to proceed shall be subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a
stop sign.
(2) Flashing yellow ( caution signal). When a yellow lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles may proceed through the intersection or past such signal only with caution.
ated" and "is used in an official trafficcontrol device" in the first sentence; inserted "or, if none, then before entering
the intersection" in subsec. (1).

History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 16; C. 1943,
57-7-93; L . 1949, ch. 65, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment inserted "illumin•

41-6-26.5. Lane-direction-control signals.-When lane-direction-control
signals are placed over the individual lanes of a street or highway, vehicular
traffic may travel in any lane over which a green signal is shown, but
shall not enter or travel in any lane over which a red signal is shown.
Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to
lane direction control signals to provide
for directional control signals over individual traffic lanes.

History: c. 1953, 41-6-26.5, enacted by
L. 1969, ch. 105, § 1.
Title of Act.
An act enacting a new section 41-6-26.5,

41-6-27. Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals, lights or markings
-Commercial advedising-Public nuisance-Removal.-(a) No person
shall place, maintain, or display upon or in view of any highway any
unauthorized sign, signal, light, marking, or device which purports to be or
is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic-control device or railroad
sign or signal, or authorized emergency vehicle flashing light, or which attempts to direct the movement of traffic, or which hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness of any official traffic [-control] device or any
railroad sign or signal, or which is of such brilliant illumination and so
positioned as to blind or dazzle a driver on any highway adjacent thereto,
and no person shall place or maintain nor shall any public authority permit
upon any highway any traffic sign or signal bearing thereon any commercial
advertising. This shall not be deemed to prohibit the erection upon private
property adjacent to highways of signs giving useful directional information and of a type that cannot be mistaken for official signs.
(b) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or marking is declared to
be a public nuisance and the authority having jurisdiction over the highways is empowered to remove the same or cause it to be removed without
notice.
History : L. 1941, ch. 52, § 17; C. 1943,
57-7-94; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch.
86, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment inserted "or which
is * * * highway adjacent thereto," in
subsec. (a).
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The 1961 amendment inserted "light,"
before "marking" and "or a uthorized
emergency vehicle flashing light" before
"or which attempts" in the nrst sentence
of subsec. (a) and substituted "prohibited
sign, signal, or ligh t, or marking" for

"such prohibited sign, signal or ma
and
(b). "highways" for "highway" in 1

The bracketed word "-control" w
serted by the compiler.

41-6-28. Interference With signs and signals prohibited,-No pe
shall without lawful authority attempt lo or in fact alter, deface, in;
knock down, or remove any official traffic-control device or any raib
sign thereof.
or signal or any inscription, shield, or insignia thereon, or any o
part
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 18; C. 1943,
57-7-95.

ARTICLE 4
ACCIDENTS

Section 41-6-29,

n,,.,,.,,
alty.

doty

m event

of acoidenf.-Stop at •eo•o of ,eeidoat-P,

41-6-30. Involving damage to vehicle--Misdemeanor.
41-6-31. Give name-Render assistance.
41-6-32. ColJision with unattended vehicle.
41-6-33. Involving nxtures on or a djacent to highway.
41-6-34. Accidents
to notifyinvolving
police. injury, death, or damage of $100 or more-Dut
41-6-35.

Accident
reports-Duty
to forward
or r ender. of driver, witnesses and investigating office

41-6-36.

Physical incapacity of driver-Duty of other occupants or owner t,
notify police and make reports.
Forms-Contents-Penalties for failure to make report.
Livestock on highway-Collision, action for damages.
Garage keeper to report damaged vehicle.
Accident reports-Conndential-Privileged-Certincate
of compliance.
Statistical
information pub1is11ed annually.
Local powers.

41-6-37.
41-6-38.
41-6-39.
41-6-40.
41 -6-41.
41-6-42.

41-6.29. Driver's duty in event of accident-Stop at scene of accident
-PenaltY,- (a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an aeeident resolt
ing in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such Vehicle
at t he seen, of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall
then forthwith return to and in every event sha]J remain at the see,e
of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 41-6-31.
Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than i,
necessary.
(b J Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirements
under such cir cumstances shall upon conviction be Punished by imprison.
ment in the county jail for not less than thirty days nor more than one
year
or by
of not less than $100 nor moce than $5,000 or by both
such fine
andfine
imprisonment.
(c) The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license
of the person so convicted for a period not to exceed one year.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 19; C. 1943,

Compiler's Notes.
Th, 1961 amendment iaae,ted "in the

57-7-96; L. 1961, <h. 86, § l,

county jail" in subsec. (b ).
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J. Criminal prosecution.

Where, in prosecution of hit-and-run
ilriver under this section, evidence is discornrecl after t he jury h as retired to commence their deliberations which would
sustain defendant's def ense of alibi, it is
abuse of discretion and rev ersible error to
refuse to grant a new tTial on the ground
of newly discovered evi den ce, which was
not mernly cumulative. State v. Dunca n,
102 U. 449, 132 P. 2d 121.
Collateral References.
AutomobilesPl0, 336.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43; 61 C.J.S.
Motor Vehicles §§ 67 4-683.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 79 9 et seq., 861, 880 ,
Automobiles an cl Highway Traffic §§ 246 et
seq., 318, 336.

41-6-32

Constitutionality, construction, and effect of statute in relation to conduct of
driver of automobile after h a ppening of
an accident, 16 A. L. R. 1425, 66 A. L. R.
1228, 101 A. L . R. 911.
Failure to comply with statute requiring
one involved in automobile accident to
stop or report as affecting question as to
suspension or tolling statute of limitation,
10 A. L. R . 2d 564.
Failure to stop or other conduct after
automobile ac cident as supporting claim
for exemplary damages, 156 A. L. R. 1115.
Indictment or information charging failure to stop after accident, give name, etc. ,
or to render assistance, sufficiency of, 115
A. L. R. 361.
Necessity and sufficiency of showing in
a criminal prosecution under a "hit-and•
run" statute accused's knowledge of accident, injury, or damage, 23 A. L. R. 3d
497.

41-6-30. Involving damage to vehicle-Misdemeanor.-The driver of
any vehicle involved in an accident r esulting only in damage to a vehicle
which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such
vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but
shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene
of such accident until he has fulfill ed the requirements of section 41-6-31.
Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is
necessary. Any person failing to stop or comply with said requirements
under such circumstances shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 20; C. 1943,
57-7-97.

41-6-31. Give name-Render assistance.-The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or
damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall
give his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is
driving and shall upon request and if available exhibit his operator's or
chanffeur's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or
person attending any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person
injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or
the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician,
surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent
that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the
injured person.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 21; C. 1943,
57-7-98.
Collateral References.
Requirem ent that motorist r encler assistance, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 803, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic § 251.

Validity ancl construction of statute
making it a criminal offense for the operator of a motor vehicle not to carry or
display his opera tor's license or the vehicle
registration certificate, 6 A. L. R. 3d 506.

41-6-32. Coilision with unattended vehicle.-The driver of any vehicle
which collides with any vehicle which is unattended shall immediately
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stop and shall then and there either locate and notify the operat
owner of such vehicle of the name and address of the driver and <
of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or shall leave in a cm
uous place in the vehicle struck a written notice giving the name
address of the driver and of the owner of the vehicle doing the str
and a statement of the circumstances thereof.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 22; C. 1943,
57-7-99,

Collateral References.
Automobiles€:=>10.
60 C..J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.

Liability for injury to child by
mobile left una ttended in street or
way, 140 A. L. R. 538.

41-6-33. Involving :fixtures on or adjacent to highway.-The driver
any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to :fixtu
legally upon or adjacent to a highway shall take reasonable steps
locate and notify the owner or person in charge of such property of st
fact and of his name and address and of the registration number of t
vehicle he is driving and shall upon request and if available exhibit l
operator's or chauffeur's license and shall make report of such accide
when and as required in section 41-6-35 hereof.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 23; C. 1943,
57-7-100.

41-6-34. Accidents involving injury, death, or damage of $100 or mor
-Duty to notify police.-The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident r
~
•

I

I

sulting in injury to or death of any person or property damage to a
apparent extent of $100 or more, shall immediately by the quickest mean
of communication give notice of such accident to the local police depar
ment if such accident occurs within a municipality, otherwise to the offic
of the county sheriff or to a state trooper.
H istory: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 24; C. 1943,
57-7-101; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1.

Cross-References.
Failure to report accident, penalty, 4

Compiler's Notes.
The 1955 amendment inserted "or property damage to an apparent extent of
$100 or more," and substituted "state
trooper" for "state highway patrolman."

12-32.
False or forged reports, penalty, 41-1
32.

41-6-35. Accident reports-Duty of driver, witnesses and investigatin
officer to forward or render.-(a) The driver of a vehicle involved in a

accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total propert
damage to the apparent extent of $100 or more shall within :five day
after such accident forward a written report of such accident to th
department.
(b) The department may require any driver of a vehicle involved i
an accident, of which report must be made as provided in this section, t
file supplemental reports whenever the original report is insufficient in th
opinion of the department and may require witnesses of accidents t
render reports to the department.
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41-6-37

or or
owner

(c) Every law enforcement officer, who in the regular course of duty,
investigates a motor vehicle accident of which report must be made as
required in this section, either at the time of and at the scene of the
accident or thereafter by interviewing participants or witnesses, shall,
within twenty-four hours after completing such investigation, forward a
written report of such accident to the department.

autor high -

History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 25; C. 1943,
57-7-102; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1961, ch. 86,
§1; 1969, ch. 106, § 1.

ver of
x:tures
ips to
f such
of the
it his
cident

more

'nt reto an
means
lepart, office

ty, 4141-12-

gating
in an
operty
days
o the

Ved m
on, to
n the
ts to

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment substituted "five
days" for "24 hours" in subsec. (a).
The 1961 amendment substituted "$50"
for "$25" in subsec. (a).
The 1969 amendment substituted "$100"
for "$50" in subsec. (a), and made minor
changes in punctuation and phraseology
throughout.

1.

Manslaughter.

Acquittal under former statute was not
bar to manslaughter prosecution. State v.
Cheeseman, 63 U. 138, 223 P. 762, applying
Comp. Laws 1917, § 3979.
Collateral References.
AutomobilesPlO.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Failure to comply with statute requiring
one involved in automobile accident to
stop or report as affecting question as to
suspension or tolling statute of limitation,
10 A. L. R. 2d 564.

41-6-36. Physical incapacity of driver-Duty of o,ther occupants or
owner to notify police and make reports.-(a) Whenever the driver of a
vehicle is physically incapable of giving an immediate notice of an accident
as required in section 41-6-34 and there was another occupant in the vehicle
at the time of the accident capable of doing so, such occupant shall give or
cause to be given the notice not given by the driver.
(b) Whenever the driver is physically incapable of making a written
report of an accident as required in section 41-6-35 and such driver is not
the owner of the vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in such accident shall within five days after learning of the accident make such report
not made by the driver.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 26; C. 1943,
57-7-103; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1955, ch.
71, § 1.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment designated the
former section as subsec. (a); deleted "or

41-6-37.

written" appearing after "immediate" in
subsec. (a); substituted "section 41-6-34"
for "Sections 24 and 25" in subsec. (a);
and added subsec. (b).
The 1955 amendment substituted "notice" for "report" twice in subsec. (a) .

Forms-Contents-Penalties for failure to make report.-{a)

The department shall prepare and upon request supply to police departments, justices of the peace, sheriffs, garages and other suitable agencies
or individuals, forms for accident reports required hereunder, appropriate
with respect to the persons required to make such reports and the purposes to be served. The written reports to be made by persons involved
in accidents and by investigating officers shall call for sufficiently detailed
information to disclose with reference to a traffic accident the cause, conditions then existing, and the persons and vehicles involved.
(b) Every accident report required to be made in writing shall be
made on the appropriate form approved by the department and shall
contain all of the information required therein unless not available.
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(c) E,v ery such report shall also contain information sufficient to e1
able the department to determine whether the requirements for tli
deposit of security under any of the la,vs of this state are inapplicabl
by reason of the existence of insurance or other exceptions speci:fie,
therein.
( d) The department shall suspend the license or permit to drive arn
any nonresident operating privileges of any person failing to report a1
accident as herein provided until such report has been filed. The d epartmem
may extend such suspension not to exceed 30 days. Any person convicteo
of failing to make a report as required herein shall be punished as provided in section 41-6-164.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 27; C. 1943,
57-7-104; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch.
86, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 amendment added subsecs. (c)
and (d).

The 1961 amendment inserted the second
sentence of subsec. (d).
Collateral References.
Automobiles~l0.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.

41-6-38. Livestock on highway-Collision, action for damages.-N o person owning or controlling the possession of any livestock, shall willfully
or negligently permit any such livestock to stray upon or remain Ullaccompanied by a person in charge or control thereof upon a public
highway, both sides of which are adjoined by property which is separated
from such highway by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn or
building; provided, that the foregoing provision shall not apply to range
stock drifting into any such highway in going to or returning from their
accustomed ranges. No person shall drive any such livestock upon, over
or across any public highway during the period from half an hour after
sunset to half an hour before sunrise, without keeping a sufficient number
of herders with warning lights on continual duty to open the ro ad so as
to permit the passage of vehicles. In any civil action brought by the
owner, driver or occupant of a motor vehicle or by their personal representatives or assignees, or by the owner of the livestock for damages
caused by collision with any domestic animal or animals on a highway,
there is no presumption that such collision was due to negligence on behalf
of the owner or the person in possession of such livestock.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 28; C. 1943,
57-7-105.
Cross-Reference.
Livestock highways, 27-12-117 et seq.
No presumption provision.
This provision is clear and unambiguous
and in an action where plaintiff's motorcycle collided with a horse on a highway,
it means that there is no presumption
that the defendant was guilty in permitting the horses to be upon the highway
1.

under the conditions they were found there
and the burden rests upon the plaintiff to
establish acts of negligence. Hyrum Smith
Estate Co. v. Peterson, 227 F. 2d 442.
Collateral References.
Automobiles~I0.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Lives tock or fowl on highway, liability
for killing or injuring by motor vehicle,
of, 20 A. L. R. 2d 1053.

41-6-39. Garage keeper to report damaged vehiole.-The person in
charge of any garage or repair shop to which is brought any motor
228

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

e

e
cl

t
ii

e
l

41-6-42

vehicle which shows evidence of having been involved in an accident of
which report must be made as provided in section 41-6-35, or struck by
any bullet, shall report to the department within twenty-four hours after
such motor vehicle is received, giving the engine number, registration number, and the name and address of the owner or operator of such vehicle.
Collateral References.
Automobilese:=>363.
"l C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 717.

History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 29; C. 1943,
57-7-106.

41-6-40.

Accident reports -

Confidential -

Privileged -

Certificate of

compliance.-All accident reports made by persons involved in accidents
or by garages shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting
and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state
agencies having use for the records for accident prevention purposes, or
for the administration of the laws of this state relating to the deposit of
security and proof of financial responsibility by persons driving or the
owners of motor vehicles, except that the department may disclose the
identity of a person involved in an accident when such identity is not
otherwise known or when such person denies his presence at such accident. No such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or
criminal, arising out of an accident, except/ that the department shall
furnish upon demand of any person who has, or claims to have, made
such a r eport or, upon demand of any court, a certificate showing that
a specified accident report has or has not been made to the department
solely to prove a compliance or a failure to comply with the requirement that such a report be made to the department.
Collateral References.
Auto mo bilese::a,10.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
Stopping, identification, and a.id by motorist after accident, 7 Ant ; Jur. 2d 799
et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic
§ 246 et seq.

History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 30; C. 1943,
57-7-107; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1,
Compiler's Notes. ·
The 1949 amendment inserted "6r for
the administration * * * motor vehicles,"
after "accident prevention purposes," in
the first sentence.

Admissibility of report of operator, filed
pursuant to law, r especting auto mo bile
accident, 69 A. L. R. 905.

Cross-Reference.
Financial responsibility division to furnish copies of officers' reports on ac·d dents
upon r equest, fees, 41-12-3.1.

41-6-41. Statistical information published annually.-The department
shall tabulate and may analyze all accident reports and shall publish
annually, or at more frequent intervals, statistical information based
thereon as to the number and circumstances of traffic accidents.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 31; C. 1943,
57-7-108.

41-6-42. Local powers.-Any incorporated city, tQwn, village, or other
municipality may by ordinance -r,equire that the driver of a vehicle involved
in an accident shall also file wi'th the designated city d epartment a report
of such accident or a 'copy of anjr' report herein required to be filed with

229

41-6-43

MOTOR VEHICLES

the department . .All such reports shall be for the confidential use of the
city department and subject to the provisions of section 41-6-40.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 32; C. 1943,
57-7-109.

ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING
Section 41-6-43.
Powers of local authorities.
41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide--Death occurring within one year-PenaltyRevocation of license or privilege to drive.
41-6-44.
Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor-Presumption
arising from alcoholi<; content of blood-Driving under the influence of drugs-Criminal punishment-Revocation of licenseArrest without warrant.
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcoholic content of bloodRefusal to allow-Revocation of license-Court action on revocation-Person incapable of refusal-Results of test available-Who
may give test.
41-6-45.
Reckless driving-Penalty,

t
t l

41-6-43. Powers of local authorities.-(a) Local authorities may by
ordinance provide that it shall be unlawful for any person who is under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or is an habitual user or under the influence
of any narcotic drugs or any other drug to a degree which renders him
incapable of safely driving a vehicle to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle, for the use of chemical tests and for evidentiary presumptions, and for penalties therefor as a first offense consistent with
section 41-6-44.

(b) Local authorities may also by ordinance provide that any person
who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property is guilty of reckless driving, and provide penalties
therefor as a first offense consistent with section 41-6-45.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 33; C. 1943,
57-7-110; L. 1957, ch. 75, § 1; 1967, ch.
88, § 1; 1969, ch. 107, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.

Cross-Reference.
Traffic regulations, powers and duties of
cities as to, 10-8-30.

1. Powers of cities.
The 1957 amendment made no change in
this section.
City held to have power to pass ordiPrior to the 1967 amendment, subsec.
nance prohibiting driving while intoxicat(a) read: "Local authorities may by ordi- ·ed, notwithstanding statute on the subject.
nance provide that it sl1all be unlawful
Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 U. 113, 93 P.
2d 671.
for any person who is an habitual user
of narcotic drugs or any person who is
Collateral References.
under the influence of intoxicating liquor
Automobiles~•332.
or narcotic drugs to drive or be in actual
physical control of any vehicle, and pro61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 625-630.
vide penalties therefor as a first offense
Driving while intoxicated or under in•
consistent with section 41-6-44."
fluence of liquor or drugs, 7 Am. Jur. 2d
805 et seq., Automobiles and Highway
Tl1e 1969 amendment, in subsec. (a),
Traffic § 253 et seq.
inserted "for the use of chemical tests and
for evidentiary presumptions" after "any
vehicle" and made minor changes in puncConstitutionality of legislative delega•
tuation and phraseology.
tion of powers to prescribe or vary regulations concerning motor vehicles used on
highways, 87 A. L. R. 546.
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41-6-43.10

41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide - Death occurring within one yearPenalty-Revocation of license or privilege to drive.-(a) When the death
of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of
others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent
homicide.
(b) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by fine of not
less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) The department shall revoke the license or permit to drive and
any nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent
homicide.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.10, enacted by
L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 2.

while fully conscious or aware of the
danger in following such course. State v.
Berchtold, 11 U. (2d) 208, 357 P. 2d 183.
Compiler's Notes.
Inattentive driving in the face of grave
The 1957 amendment inserted "in the
danger constitutes reckless disregard for
county jail'' after "imprisonment" in subthe safety of others. State v. Berchtold,
sec. (b).
11 U. (2d) 208, 357 P. 2d 183.
The term "reckless disregard" requires
Title of Act.
a much greater degree of disregard for the
An act amending sections 41-6-6, 41-6-7,
safety of others than does ordinary lack
41-6-8, 41-6-9, 41-6-34, 41-6-36, 41-6-47, 41of due care for such safety, or mere
6-49, 41-6-70, 41-6-76, 41-6-77, 41-6-82, 41-6- , negligence. State v. Berchtold, 11 U. (2d)
90, 41-6-114, 41-6-117, 41-6-120, 41-6-121,
208, 357 P. 2d 183.
41-6-123, 41-6-124, 41-6-129, 41-6-131, 41-6- ·
2. Double jeopardy.
133, 41-6-141, 41-6-142, 41-6-149, 41-6-159,
·and 27-1-28, Utah Code Annotated 1953;
Where a defendant originally was
repealing and re-enacting sections 41-6-14,
charged with negligent homicide under
41-6-64, 41-6-130, 41-6-132, 41-6-134, 41-6this section and, after a preliminary hear135, 41-6-140, and 41-6-144, Utah Code
ing, the charge was dismissed and he was
Annotated 1953; enacting new sections
charged, tried, and convicted of automobile
41-6-43.10, 41-6-72.10, 41-6-121.10, 41-6homicide under 76-30-7.4, he was not placed
. 140.10, 41-6-140.20, and 41-6-154.10, Utah
twice in jeopardy by being tried for autoCode Annotated 1953; and repealing secmo bile homicide after dismissal of the
tion 27-9-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953;
lesser charge. State v. Romero, 12 U. (2d)
210, 364 P. 2d 828.
relating to the regulation of traffic on
highways, and defining certain crimes in
3. Evidence.
the use and operation of vehicles, preWhere a defendant was charged with
scribing the equipment used on vehicles
negligent homicide because he ran a red
and requiring the giving of notice of accilight and was involved in an intersection
dents by operators or occupants of motor
collision, he should have been allowed to
vehicles involved.
introduce evidence of other similar acciCross-Reference.
dents occurring at the same intersection,
and the city traffic engineer, as an expert,
Automobile homicide, 76-30-7.4.
should have been permitted to testify as to
1. Construction.
the lenses in the semaphore signal and
A defendant is guilty of reckless distheir tendency to cause "sun phantom."
regard for the safety of others if the
State v . Stewart, 12 U. (2d) 273, 365 P. 2d
785.
evidence supports a finding that the deWhere the evidence showed that from
fendant consciously chose a course of
the length of defendant's skid marks
action knowing that such course would
place his guest in grave and serious danger
the police estimated his speed to have been
· or with knowledge of facts which would
55 to 65 miles p er hour at the time his
auto struck and killed a pedestrian in a
disclose such danger to any reasonable per35-mile-per-hour zone, and that the defendson. This does not require a finding that
ant was familiar with the area and should
defendant was fully conscious of the great
have realized that people might be crossing
danger to others since the statute does not
the highway in the area, there was suffirequire an intentional accident nor the
cient evidence upon which the trial court
choosing _of , a highly dangerous course
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could base its finding that defendant was
guilty of negligent homicide. State v.
Park, 17 U. (2d ) 90, 404 P. 2d 677.
Where evidence showed that defendant
knew of stop sign and restricted view at
intersection where the collision occurred,
and that, whether or not defendant ran
the stop sign, he wa s trav eling in excess
of forty miles per hour when he reached
the point of impact, and that the two
vehicles were so close together when defendant ent ered the intersection that the
driv er of the other auto h a d no opportunity to apply her brakes prior to the
collision, such evidence was sufficient to
show conduct evincing a reckless disregard
for the safety of others. State v. Selman,
18 U. (2d) 199, 417 P. 2d 975.

of the state, a view by the jury o
site of the tragedy was had under 77and the participation of the trial
th ereat in asking numerous questio~
prosecution witnesses, where the n
showed that the judge showed unt
sympathy for defendant, an apparent
rodder, including the sentencing of
fond a nt to but sixty days, servable
week ends. State v. Delaney, 15 U. (
338, 393 P. 2d 379.

Collateral References.
Automobilese::,342, 344.
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 657-671.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 831, Automobiles
Highway Traffic § 283.

View of tragedy.
Defendant, convicted of negligent homicide by automobile under this section, was
not prejudiced because, at the instance

4.

1·

i:'
•• I
I

' I

a1

What amounts to negligent homicid
within meaning of statutes penalizing nee
ligent homicide by operation of a moto
vehicl e, 20 A. L. R. 3d 473.

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor-Presumption arising from alcoholic content of blood-Driving under the influence
of drugs-Criminal punishment-Revocation of license-Arrest without
warrant.-(a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection
( d ) of this section for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this
state.
(b) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of
this section relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or in any civil suit or proceeding arising out of acts
alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, the amount of alcohol in the person's blood at the time- alleged as
shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, breath, or other bodily
substance shall give rise to the following presumptions:
1. If there was at that time 0.05 per cent or less by weight of alcohol
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was not under
the influence of intoxicating liquor;
2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 per cent but less than
0.08 per cent by weight of alcohol in . the person's blood, such fact shall
not give rise to any presumption that ·the person was or was not under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered with
other competent evidence in determining whether the person was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor;
3. If there was at the time 0.08 per cent or more by weight of alcohol
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor;
4. The foregoing provisions of this subdivision shall not be construed
as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon
232
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the question whether or not the person was under the influence of intoxi.
eating liquor.
(c) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection (d) of this
section for any person who is an habitual user of or under the influence
of any narcotic drug or any other drug to a degree which renders him
incapable of safely driving a vehicle to drive or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state. The fact that any person charged
with a violation of this subsection is or has been entitled to use such
drug under the laws of this state shall not constitute a defense against any
charge of violating this subsection.
(d) Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than
6 months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $299, or by both
such fine and imprisonment; provided that in the event such person shall
have inflicted a bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having
operated said vehicle in a reckless or negligent manner or with a wanton
or reckless disregard of human life or safety, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year , and, in the
discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than $1,000.
(e) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section when such violation is coupled with an accident or
collision in which such person is involved and when such violation has in
fact been committed, although not in his presence, when the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by such
person.
The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of any
person convicted under this section.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C.
1943, 57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957,
ch. 75, § 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch.
107, § 2.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1949 a mendment rewrote subsec. (b)
and added subds. 1, 2, 3 and 4 thereto.
The amendment also added subsecs. (c)
and (d), ancl made other changes in
phraseology.
The 1957 amendment deleted "upon a
first conviction" after "punished" the first
time it appears in subsec. (d) and substituted the proviso for provisions applying
to second or subsequent convictions and
deleted "or under an ordinance as provided by section 41-6-43 (a)" at the end
of the section.
The 1967 amendment, in sub sec. (a),
deleted "an habitual user of narcotic
drugs or any person who is" after "person
who is" and deleted "or narcotic drugs"
after "intoxicating liquor"; in sub secs.
(b) and (d), substituted "person" and
"person's" for "defendant" and "defendant's" where the references appear; in

subp aragraphs 2 and 3 of subsec. (b),
substituted "0.08 per cent" for "0.15 per
cent"; in subsec. ( c), substituted "section"
for "subsection" before "for any person,"
cleletecl "who is under the influ ence of"
following "narcotic drug or" and inserted
"or be in a ctual physical control" following "to drive"; in subsec. (cl), substituted
"nor" for "or" after "$100" and inserted
"by" before "a fine"; and the amendment
added subsec. (e).
The 1969 amendment, in sub sec. (b), inserted "or in any civil suit * * * under the
influen ce of intoxicating liquor" and deleted "urine" before "breath" in the first
sentence; in subsec. (b), 2, substituted
"whether the person was under th e influence of intoxicating liquor" for "the
guilt or innocence of the person"; and
made minor changes in punctuation and
phraseology throughout.
1.

Constitutionality.

It is within the prerogative of the legislature to make it unlawful for one to drive
a vehicle while under the influence of
liquor and to provide a greater penalty if,
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while doing so, he injures another by
recklessness or negligence. State v. Brennan, 13 U. (2d) 195, 371 P. 2d 27.
This section does not deal with two
separate subjects and thus transgress
Const., Art. 1, § 12 which requires that
legislative acts must contain only one
subject. State v. Brennan, 13 U. (2d) 195,
371 P . 2d 27.

·2.

Blood-alcohol test.
Where officer testified that he obtained
the defendant's consent to the taking of a
blood-alcohol test, which fact was also
attested by the nurse and by the physician
who took the blood sample, the evidence
left no doubt that defendant gave his
consent to such a test. State v. Bryan, 16
U. (2d) 47, 395 P. 2d 539.
After an accused has been lawfully
placed under arrest it is the duty of the
officers to make a search for evidence
relative to the commission of the crime.
The blood-alcohol test is designed for that
purpose. State v. Bryan, 16 U. (2d) 47,
395 P. 2d 539.

Delay in arrest.
Where law enforcement officers on arriving at scene of automobile collision
found injured defendant sitting on curb
and took him to a nearby hospital for
treatment of his wounds before making
arrest, the delay in the arrest was not unreasonable. State v. Bryan, 16 U. (2d) 47,
395 P. 2d 539.
3.

4.

Double jeopardy.
In a prosecution for violating this section, although court erred in refusing
state's request to submit case to jury on
included offense of drunken driving, double
jeopardy did not permit further proceedings against defendant. State v. Brennan,
13 U. (2d) 195, 371 P. 2d 27.
Included offense.
Subdivision (a) of this section prohibits
the driving of a motor vehicle while under
the influence of liquor as a separate offense , with a separate punishment as a
misdemeanor as set forth in subdivision
( d); and it is necessarily included in the
greater offense of driving while intoxicated and injuring another in a reckless
or negligent manner, which is punishable
as an indictable misdemeanor. State v.
Brennan, 13 U. (2d) 195, 371 P. 2d 27.

5.

6.

Public intoxication.
Following an automobile collision defendant was sitting on curb holding a
handkerchief to his head which was bleedmg; there was a strong odor of alcohol on
his breath; he appeared to be intoxicated,
and in fact stated that he was drunk. A

bottle containing whiskey was foun
the floor of his a utomobile. He was t.
to a nearby hospital where his wo
were attended and he was placed u:
arrest under this section for operatin
motor vehicle while intoxicated. Ui
such circumstances arrest of defendant
justified though offense for which he ·
arrested was not committed in the p;
ence of the arresting officer, the defend:
b eing intoxicated in a public place in v
lation of 32-7-13, and upon death of i
passengers, he was charged with auton
bile homicide under 76-30-7.4. State
Bryan, 16 U. (2d) 47, 395 P. 2d 539.

7.

Conflict between state and city author
ties.
City h eld to have power to pass 01
dinance prohibiting driving while in
toxicated, notwithstanding statute on th(
subject. Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 U.
113, 93 P. 2d 671.
If city ordinance prescribes the punishment for drunken driving as confinement
in city jail, court or judge is without
a uthority to order confinement in county
jail. Ex parte Folck, 102 U. 470, 132 P.
2d 130.
Where evidence is conflicting, it is for
the jury to say whether defendant was
guilty of driving a vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. State
v . Stewart, 110 U. 203, 171 P. 2d 383,
Conviction of the crime of involuntary
manslaughter as the result of a collision
between an automob ile, which defendant
was driving, and a pedestrian was upheld,
where evidence showed that he had imbibed to such a degree that it was ap•
parent to all who saw and heard him that
his locomotion and his power of speech
were markedly affected, and it appeared
that such criminal negligence contributed
to the death. A person who drives a car
while in such a condition is reckless and
evinces a marked disregard for the safety
of others and is therefore guilty of criminal negligence. State v. Capps, lll U.
189, 176 P. 2d 873.
8.

Proof to sustain conviction.
Under former subsec. (a) "operating an
automobile on a public street or highway
by one under the influence of intoxicating
liquor is itself an unlawful act and an
offense." But a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter will be reversed unless the
charge is sufficiently proven. State v.
Johnson, 76 U. 84, 88, 287 P. 909, overruled on other grounds in State v. Crank,
105 U. 332, 355, 142 P. 2d 178, 188, 170
A. L. R. 542.
Testimony that three or four hours
after accident liquor was detected by
odor on defendant's breath does not prove
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the charge of drunken driving, and "driving an automobile in violation of traffic
rules or ordinances in one or more particulars, or driving it negligently or even
recklessly, resulting in an accident, does
not relevantly tend to prove that the
driver was under the influence of intoxicating liquor." State v. Johnson, 76 U.
84, 88, 287 P. 909, overruled on other
grounds in State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 355,
142 P. 2d 178, 188, 170 A. L. R. 542.
9. Proof of prior convictions.

Upon trial of information for drunken
driving, introduction of evidence of prior
convictions before a determination of the
issue on the substantive charge, even if
erroneous, would not warrant directing an
acquittal, and evidence of prior conviction
is admissible, even though conviction followed plea of guilty. However, conviction
after a plea of guilty is nevertheless a
prior conviction and may be shown under
proper procedure. But until a verdict has
been rendered on the principal issue, there
is no occasion to mention prior convictions,
since previous offenses would not be competent to prove that defendant committed
the offense for which he is then on trial.
State v. Stewart, 110 U. 203, 171 P. 2d
383, pointing out manner of showing prior
convictions from the records of justice
and city courts, notwithstanding informality of proceedings in such courts and
lack of judgment book.
Where the defendant is charged with
ri prior conviction of driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor it is
incumbent upon the state to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the prior conviction.
It was then the exclusive province of the
jury to determine from the evidence
whether the state had done so. The trial
court's comments on the evidence and his
limiting the jury's deliberation to whether
the record of the prior conviction was
authentic was error prejudicial to defendant. State v. H a rris, 1 U. (2d) 182, 264
P. 2d 284, 39 A. L. R. 2d 553 .
Upon information charging defendant
with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and with commission of prior
offense, where the docket of the justice
of the peace was received in evidence, the
page identified and th e verity of the entry
stipulated to in open court as being in
the handwriting of the justice, the entry,
under section 78-5-16, became prima facie
evidence of the facts so stated, and no
evidence to the contrary having been
offered, must be presumed to be correct
ancl sustains the court's finding of guilt
of prior conviction. State v. Bailey, 3 U.
(2d) 254, 282 P. 2d 3?9.

10.

41-6-44

Procedure to be followed where prior
convictions alleged.

As a guide for future cases, where there
is an allega tion of prior crimes or prior
convictions, the Supreme Court has outlined the procedure to be followed in the
trial courts, which will properly expedite
the adjudication of such cases, while at
the same time safeguarding the substantial
rights of accused persons, and prevent an
accused person from being advertised to
the jury as one who previously perpetrated
a similar type of offense. State v. Stewart,
110 U. 203, 171 P. 2d 383, setting out the
procedure at length, following Connecticut
cases. For a full recitation of this procedure, see 76-1-18.
11. Venue.
Where the testimony adequately established where the offense was committed,
the court will take judicial notice that
that point is in the county so that the
venue has been suffi.ciently established.
State v. Bailey, 3 U. (2d) 254, 282 P. 2d
339, 340.
Collateral References.
Automobilese:=>332.
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 628.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 805-814, Automobiles and
Highway Traffic §§ 253-262.
Admissibility and weight of evidence
based on scientific test for intoxication
or presence of alcohol in system, 127 A. L.
R. 1513, 159 A. L. R. 209.
Admiss ibility, in vehicle accident case,
of evidence of opposing party's intoxication where litigant's pleading failed to allege such fact, 26 A. L. R. 2d 359.
Admissibility of hospital record relating
to intoxication or sobriety of patient, 38
A. L. R. 2d 778.
Constitutionality and effect of statute
relating to civil liability of person driving
automobile while under influence of liquor,
56 A. L. R. 327.
Degree or nature of intoxication for
purposes of statute or ordinance making
it a criminal offense to operate an automobile while in that condition, 142 A. L.
R. 555.
Driving automob,i le while intoxicated as
a substantive criminal offense, 42 A . L. R.
1498, 49 A. L. R. 1392, 68 A . L. R. 1356,
142 A. L. R. 555.
Drugs, driving under the influence, or
when addicted to use of as criminal offense,
17 A. L. R. 3d 815.
Intoxication from specified percentages
of alcohol present in system, construction
and application of statutes creating presumption or other inference, 16 A. L. R .
3d 748.
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What constitutes driving, being in control of, or operating a motor vehicle within
statute making such act, while intoxicated,
an offense, 47 A. L. R. 2d 570.

What i s "motor vehicle" within statt
making it offense to drive while int(
cated, 66 A. L. R. 2d 1146.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Proof of intoxication.
In a prosecution for automobile homicide
where there was competent, substantial,
expert testimony that defendant's alcoholblood content was not only 0.15, but 0.224,
which would impair motor and sensory

reactions, an instruction by the court th:
0.15 alcohol-blood content raised a pr,
sumption that one would be under th
influence was not prejudicial. State ,
Romero, 12 U. (2d) 210, 364 P. 2d 828.

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcoholic content of
blood-Refusal to allow-Revocation of license-Court action on revocation
-Person incapable o.f refusal-Results of test available-Who may give
test.-(a) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be
deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath or blood
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, provided
that such test is administered at the direction of a peace officer having
reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been driving in an
intoxicated condition. The arresting officer shall determine within reason
which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered.
(b) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be
determined to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his
blood or urine :for the purpose of determining whether he was driving or
was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence
of any narcotic drug or other drug if arrested for any offense where, at
the time of arrest, the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe
such person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of a narcotic drug or other drug.
( c) If such person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter
been requested to submit to any one of the chemical tests provided for in
subsections (a) or (b) of this section and refuses to submit to such
chemical test, the test shall not be given and the arresting officer shall
advise the person of his rights under this section. Within twenty days
after receiving an affidavit from the arresting officer to the effect that such
person has refused a chemical test the department shall notify such person
of a hearing before the department. If at said hearing the department
determines that the person was granted the right to submit to a chemical
test and without reasonable cause refused to submit to such test, or if
such person fails to appear before the department as required in the notice,
the department shall revoke for one year his license or permit to drive.
Any person whose license has been revoked by the department under the
provisions of this section shall have the right to file a petition within
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the district court
in the county in which such person shall reside. Such court is hereby
vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the matter for trial
de novo upon ten days' written notice to the department and thereupon to
take testimony and examine into the facts of the case and to determine
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whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the provisions
of this act.
(d) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test
or tests shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in
subsections (a) or (b) of this section, and the test or tests may be administered whether such person has been arrested or not.
(e) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such
test shall be made available to him.
(f) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or duly authorized laboratory technician, acting at the r equest of a police officer
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug
content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine or
breath spe cimen. Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or
duly authorized laboratory technician who, at the direction of a peace
officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom the p eace officer
has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital
or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall b e immune from any
civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such test is administered according to standard medical practice.
(g) The person tested shall be permitted to have a physician of his
own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the one administered
at the direction of the peace officer.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by
L. 1957, ch. 80, § [1]; L. 1959, ch. 65, § 1;
1967, ch. 88, § 3; 1969, ch. 107, § 3.
Compiler's Notes.
Th e 1959 amendment deleted references
to a chemical test of saliva in former
subsecs. (a) and (c); d eleted a former
third sentence which read: "In such event
the department shall revoke, for one year,
his license or permit to drive" and inserted the third and fourth sentences;
deleted refer ences to can cellation or suspension of licenses in the last sentence
of former subsec. (a) and made other
minor ch a nges in phraseology and punctuation.
The 1967 amendment, in former subsec.
(a), substituted "peace officer" for "police
offic er" and deleted a clause from the encl
of the first sentence which read: " a nd in
accordance with the rules and regulations
established by the department," inserted
the second sentence, added "and the arresting officer shall ad v ise the pel'Son of
his rights un der the section" at the end
of the third sentence and rewrote the
fourth sentence without making · a substantial change in its provisions; in former
subsec. ( c), inserted "registered nurse,
practical nurse" in the first sentence and
added the third sentence; and, in former
sub sec. ( cl) substituted "peace officer" for
"police officer."

The 1969 amen dm ent inserted subsecs .
(b) and (d), divided former subsec. (a)
into present subsecs. (a) and (c); in present subsec. (a), substituted "breath or
blood" for "breath, b loo d or urine"; in
subsec. (c), inserted "provided for in subsections (a) or (b) of this section"; redesignated former subsecs. (b) to ( d) as
( e) to (g); in subsec. (f), inserted "or
drug" after "alcoholic"; a nd made minor
changes in punctuation and phraseology in
sub sec. ( c) .
Title of Act.
An act creating a new section to be
known as 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated
1953, relating to chemical tests for persons
suspected of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol.
1.

Constitutionality-standing to raise.

Motorist who submitted to b lood-a lcohol
test and was convicted of driving while intoxicated h ad no standing to challenge
constitutionality of t his section, not having been convicted under or by reason of
it. Salt Lake City v. P erkins, 9 U. (2d)
317, 343 P. 2cl 1106.

2.

Prerequisites for admission into evidence.
Chemical test could not be taken without driver's consent prior to his arrest, so
that district cou1·t erred in admitting re-
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sults of test in prosecution for automobile
homicide where defendant had objected to
taking of blood sample and was not, at
time blood sample was extracted, under
arrest. State v. Cruz, 21 U. (2d) 406, 446
P. 2d 307.
3.

Choice of tests.
The 1959 amendment to this section did

not change the section so as to alter the
court's interpretation that the choice of
chemical tests is to be made by the driver
and not by the officer and, where an officer
failed to give the driver his choice of tests,
he failed to comply with the statute and
revocation of the driver's license under the
implied consent law was invalid. Bean v.
State, 12 U. (2d) 76, 362 P. 2d 750.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Construction and application.
A person is deemed to give his consent
to a chemical test of some one of the designated substances, breath, blood, urine, or
saliva, but not all of them; and where a
motorist, arrested by an officer on the suspicion of being intoxicated, was advised
that he must submit to a blood test or his
license would be revoked, it was not in ac•
cordance with the statute and there was no
proper basis for revoking his license. Ring•
wood v. State, 8 U. (2d) 287, 333 P. 2d
943.

Evidence.
Prior to the enactment of this section
it was held, in an action against the
estate of a deceased for injuries arising
out of an automobile accident, that the
testimony of a doctor who made a blood
test from blood taken from the deceased's
body without the consent of the deceased's
parents was admissible in evidence. Fretz
v. Anderson, 5 U. (2d) 290, 300 P. 2d 642,
646.

41-6-45. Reckless driving-Penalty.-(a) Any person who drives any
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property
is guilty of reckless driving.
(b) Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished
upon a first conviction by imprisonment for a period of not less than
five days nor more than six months or by a fine of not less than $25 nor
more than $299, or by both such fine and imprisonment. On a second
or subsequent conviction, or on a conviction under this section subsequent to a conviction under an ordinance as provided in section 41-6-43 (b),
he shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten days nor more
than six months, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $1,000 or
by both such fine and imprisonment. For the purpose of this section such
second violation shall have occurred within three years of the preceding
violation. The department shall suspend for a period not exceeding three
months, the operator's or chauffeur's license of any person convicted upon
three charges of reckless driving committed within a period of twelve
months; provided, however, that if, upon a first or second conviction the justice or judge shall recommend suspension of the convicted person's license,
the department shall suspend the said license for a period not to exceed
three months.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 35; C. 1943,
57-7-112.
Cross-Reference.
Reckless driving as misdemeanor, 76-49·
1.

Former jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist for reckless
driving held not bar to subsequent prose•
cution for involuntary manslaughter. State

1.

v. Empey, 65 U. 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A. L.
R. 558, r eviewed in State v. Thatcher,
108 U. 63, 157 P. 2d 258.
Collateral References.
Automobiles¢::>330.
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 609-624.
Reckless driving, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 815 et
seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic
§ 263 et seq.
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"Assured clear distance ahead" or "radius of lights" application of doctrine
to accident involving pedestrian crossing
street or highway, 31 A. L. R . 2d 1424.
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for
automobiles, 29 A. L. R. 883.
Homicide or assault in connection with
operation of automobile at unlawful speed,
99 A. L . R. 756.
"Residence district," "business district,"
"school area," and the like, in statut es
and ordinances regulating speed of motor
vehicles, 50 A. L . R. 2d 343.

41-6-46

Statute prohibiting reckless driving;
definiteness and certainty, 12 A . L . R. 2d
580.
Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding rnnning of automobile so as to inflict damage or injury, 47 A . L . R. 255.
What amounts to reckless driving, 86 A.
L . R. 1273, 52 A. L. R. 2d 1337.
When automobile is under control, 28 A.
L . R. 952.

ARTICLE 6
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
Section 41-6-46.

Speed regulations - Maximum speeds - School buildings - Intersections, crossings, and curves-Emergency power of the governor.
41-6-47. Prima facie limit.
41-6-48. Speed restrictions- Powers of local authorities.
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations.
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges-Prima facie evidence.
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway-Barricade or obstruction
therefor.
41-6-52. Violation- Pleading.
41-6-52.1. Resume speed road sign.

41-6-46. Speed regulations - Maximum speeds - School buildings Intersections, crossings, and curves - Emergency power of the governor.(1) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater
than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event
speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with
any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in
compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due
care.
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful
but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful:
(a) Twenty miles per hour.
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school
recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or
closing hours; provided, that local authorities may require a complete
stop before passing a school building or grounds at any of said periods.
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any business or residential district.
(c) Sixty miles per hour in other locations during the daytime.
(d) Fifty miles per hour in such other locations during the nighttime.
Daytime means from half hour before sunrise to half hour after sunset.
Nighttime means at any other hour.
(3) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements
of subdivision (1) of this section, drive at an appropriate r educed speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing,
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